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Phi Delta Phi
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ΦΔΦ - Phi Delta Phi The Coat of Arms of Phi Delta Phi
Founded December 13, 1869 (1869-12-13) (age 137)
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
Type Professional
Scope International
Motto Friends of Justice and Wisdom
Colors Garnet and Pearl Blue
Symbol Owl, Skull
Flower Jacquerninot Rose
Headquarters 1426 21st Street NW
Washington, D.C., USA
Homepage Phi Delta Phi Website

Phi Delta Phi is the world's largest legal fraternity whose membership is restricted to students and practitioners of the law. Phi Delta Phi is the second oldest legal organization in continuous existence in the United States and third oldest in North America. The fraternity was founded at the University of Michigan in 1869 "to promote a higher standard of professional ethics." Unlike other law fraternities, Phi Delta Phi does not initiate undergraduate or pre-law students.
Contents
[hide]

* 1 History
* 2 Notable Members
o 2.1 U.S. Presidents
o 2.2 Supreme Court Justices
o 2.3 Other Notable Members
* 3 Inns
* 4 External links

[edit] History

The old professional fraternity still in existence, Phi Delta Phi was founded in the law department of the University of Michigan by John M. Howard of the class of 1871. Howard was a graduate of Monmouth College and member of Phi Gamma Delta (Fiji). His initial intent was to found a chapter of Fiji at the University, but he did not follow through with the plan because of the large number of chapters already in place on the campus. Howard instead turned his efforts toward founding a fraternity devoted purely to students of the legal profession.

[edit] Notable Members

[edit] U.S. Presidents

* Gerald R. Ford
* William McKinley
* Franklin D. Roosevelt
* Theodore Roosevelt
* William H. Taft

[edit] Supreme Court Justices

* Hugo Black
* Benjamin N. Cardozo
* Anthony M. Kennedy
* Thurgood Marshall
* Sandra Day O'Connor
* Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr.
* William H. Rehnquist
* Antonin Scalia
* John Paul Stevens
* Potter Stewart
* William H. Taft
* Earl Warren
* Byron R. White

[edit] Other Notable Members

* John Bayard Anderson
* John Ashcroft
* Howard Baker
* James A. Baker III
* Birch E. Bayh
* Matthew J. Belcher
* Robert H. Bork
* William J. Brennan
* Ellen Burns
* Pamela Carter
* William Colby
* Archibald Cox
* John Danforth
* Joyce Hens Green
* Charles Evans Hughes
* Daniel K. Inouye
* Henry M. Jackson
* Thomas Penfield Jackson
* Leon Jaworski
* Robert F. Kennedy
* Patrick Leahy
* Karl Llewellyn
* Gerald T. McLaughlin
* Edwin Meese III
* Walter Mondale
* Malcolm W. Monroe
* R. Thomas Olson
* Samuel Pierce Jr.
* William L. Prosser
* Dana Rasmussen
* Sam Rayburn
* Stephen R. Reinhardt
* Owen J. Roberts
* Myra C. Selby
* William French Smith
* Kenneth W. Starr
* Adlai Stevenson
* Potter Stewart
* Wendell Willkie

[edit] Inns

Chapters of Phi Delta Phi are known as Inns. The Inns obtain their names after the Inns of Court in the English system. The following list includes some of the early Inns of Phi Delta Phi.

1. Kent Inn, University of Michigan, 1869
2. Sharswood, University of Pennsylvania, 1875
3. Benjamin Inn, Illinois Wesleyan University, 1878
4. Booth Inn, Northwestern University, 1880
5. Story Inn, Columbia University, 1881
6. Cooley Inn, Washington University in St. Louis, 1882
7. Pomeroy Inn, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1883
8. John Marshall Inn, George Washington University, 1884
9. Jay Inn, Albany Law School, 1884
10. Webster Inn, Boston University, 1885
11. Hamilton Inn, University of Cincinnati, 1886
12. Gibson-Alexander Inn, University of Pennsylvania, 1886
13. Choate Inn, Harvard University, 1887
14. Waite Inn, Yale University, 1887
15. Field Inn, New York University, 1888
16. Conkling Inn, Cornell University, 1888
17. Tiedeman Inn, University of Missouri-Columbia, 1890
18. Minor Inn, University of Virginia, 1890
19. Dillon Inn, University of Minnesota, 1890
20. Daniels Inn, State University of New York, 1891
21. Chase Inn, University of Oregon, 1891
22. Harlan Inn, University of Wisconsin, 1891
23. Swan Inn, The Ohio State University, 1893
24. McClain Inn, University of Iowa, 1893
25. Lincoln Inn, University of Nebraska, 1895
26. Osgoode Inn, York University, 1869
27. Fuller Inn, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1896
28. Miller Inn, Stanford University, 1897
29. Green Inn, University of Kansas, 1897
30. Comstock Inn, Syracuse University, 1899
31. Dwight Inn, New York Law School, 1899
32. Foster Inn, University of Indiana, 1900
33. Ranney Inn, Case Western Reserve University, 1901
34. Langdell Inn, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1901
35. Brewer Inn, University of Denver, 1902
36. Douglas Inn, University of Chicago, 1903
37. Ballinger Inn, University of Washington, 1907
38. Malone Inn, Vanderbilt University, 1907
39. Evarts Inn, St. Lawrence University, 1907
40. Thomas Inn, University of Colorado, 1907
41. Beatty Inn, University of Southern California, 1907
42. Reed Inn, University of Maine, 1908
43. Tucker Inn, Washington and Lee University, 1908
44. Roberts Inn, University of Texas, 1909
45. Shiras Inn, University of Pittsburgh, 1909
46. Holmes Inn, University of Oklahoma, 1912
47. Ames Inn, University of South Dakota, 1912
48. Bruce Inn, University of North Dakota, 1912
49. White Inn, Tulane University, 1912
50. Jones Inn, University of California, Berkeley, 1913

[edit] External links

* Phi Delta Phi International Home
* Tiedeman Inn, University of Missouri


Professional Fraternities
Professional Fraternity Association

Alpha Zeta • Alpha Rho Chi • Alpha Tau Delta • Alpha Phi Omega • Alpha Chi Sigma • Alpha Omega • Alpha Omega Epsilon • Gamma Iota Sigma • Delta Epsilon Iota • Delta Theta Phi • Delta Omicron • Delta Sigma Pi • Zeta Phi Eta • Theta Tau • Kappa Delta Epsilon • Kappa Epsilon • Kappa Kappa Psi • Kappa Psi • Lambda Kappa Sigma • Mu Phi Epsilon • Pi Sigma Epsilon • Rho Pi Phi • Sigma Alpha • Sigma Alpha Iota • Sigma Phi Delta • Tau Beta Sigma • Phi Alpha Delta • Phi Beta • Phi Delta Epsilon • Phi Delta Phi • Phi Delta Chi • Phi Mu Alpha Sinfonia • Phi Rho Sigma • Phi Sigma Pi • Phi Chi Theta • Omega Tau Sigma
Independent Professional Fraternities
Alpha Kappa Psi • Delta Phi Epsilon • Kappa Gamma Psi • Phi Gamma Nu
Professional Fraternities in the North-American Interfraternity Conference
Alpha Gamma Rho • Sigma Phi Delta • Triangle
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phi_Delta_Phi"

Categories: United States student societies | 1869 establishments

Labels: Techxas Fair Defense Act

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Port, Kingsville get Homeland grants
March 31, 2007


Two local first-response agencies received funds from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security this week for equipment and training.





Port of Corpus Christi Authority Police and the Kingsville Specialized Crimes and Narcotics Task Force were awarded grants, as part of the Commercial Equipment Direct Assistance Program. Texas agencies alone received about $1,299,471 in equipment and training awards, according to officials with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

The program helps to ensure that law enforcement and emergency responders can acquire specialized equipment and training to meet their homeland security mission.

-Barbara Ramirez



is the crap equipment actually going to work? since the only "program" that is "part of the Commercial Equipment Direct Assistance Program."


whose pork authorized our DHS to grant this latent necessity in the DHS "mission"????????


Halo!

Our Law Enforcement should not have to get a grant just so they "can" acquire the equipment as termed; an "opportunity" that has now been modified to "can acquire" to do the JOB
vital to our "state of the county".

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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS


NO. PD-521-05

EX PARTE JAMES S. MASONHEIMER, Appellee

ON APPELLEE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

AND STATE'S CROSS-PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

FROM THE ELEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS

TAYLOR COUNTY





Hervey, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Meyers, Price, Johnson, Keasler, and Holcomb, JJ., joined. Meyers, J., filed a concurring opinion. Keller, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion. Womack, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Keller, P.J., joined. Cochran, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

O P I N I O N


Almost six years ago, appellee was charged with murder. The State seeks to try him a third time after the first two proceedings were terminated prior to final judgment at appellee's request. Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, the evidence supports a finding that appellee's mistrial motions, which resulted in the termination of the first two proceedings prior to verdict, were provoked primarily by the State's intentional failure to disclose exculpatory evidence (1) with the specific intent to avoid an acquittal at the first proceeding. Appellee did not discover all of the undisclosed exculpatory evidence until the second proceeding. We hold that, under the unique facts of this case, a third prosecution is jeopardy-barred under the state and federal constitutions.

In September 2001, appellee was indicted for murdering his daughter Lucy's boyfriend. Appellee claimed that he killed the victim in self-defense and in defense of Lucy. The Court of Appeals' opinion summarizes the evidence that appellee intended to present at his first trial in support of these defenses:

During a pretrial hearing before the first trial, [appellee's] attorneys advised the court and the prosecution that they planned to show that [appellee] shot [the victim] in self-defense and in defense of Lucy. (Citation omitted). Defense counsel argued that he was entitled to show past bad acts of [the victim] as evidence of why Lucy was "terrified" of [the victim] and why [appellee] had a reasonable belief that use of deadly force was necessary that day [when appellee shot the victim five times in the back with a .38 revolver in the driveway of Lucy's home]. Defense counsel told the trial court that he planned to show that Lucy wanted to end her relationship with [the victim]; that [the victim's] behavior had grown increasingly aggressive toward Lucy due to his use of anabolic steroids; that [the victim] had grown increasingly jealous; that [the victim] had choked Lucy; that [the victim] had wire-tapped her telephone; that [the victim] had made threats to kill Lucy and her family if she left him; that Lucy had asked [appellee] and his wife to stay with her the night before the shooting because [she] was afraid of [the victim].


State v. Masonheimer, 154 S.W.3d 247, 250 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2005).


Appellee's first trial in December 2002 was before a jury. Soon after appellee's first trial began, the defense discovered during its cross-examination of a State's witness, Timothy Marshall, that the State had failed to disclose a statement that Marshall made to the police shortly after the offense (the Marshall statement). In this statement, Marshall, who was a neighbor of Lucy's, told the police that appellee told him minutes after the shooting that the victim "had threatened his daughter and it was either him or her." Appellee moved for a mistrial, but the trial court granted appellee a continuance and ordered the State to reexamine its file for exculpatory evidence that should be disclosed to the defense. (2) The trial court later granted another defense-requested mistrial "in the interest of justice" because a death in the family of one of the prosecutors caused the trial court to extend the continuance. Appellee's first trial, therefore, ended in a defense-requested mistrial in part because of the State's failure to disclose the Marshall statement. Soon after this, the lead prosecutor (Harper) left the district attorney's office to become a County Court-at-Law Judge.

Joiner, the assistant prosecutor in the first trial, became the lead prosecutor in the second trial. During a pretrial conference prior to the second trial, Joiner disclosed to the defense a statement from Lucy's ex-husband Billy Glenn Williams (the Williams statement) that also had not previously been disclosed to the defense. The Court of Appeals' opinion summarizes the Williams statement:

At a pretrial conference prior to the second trial, defense counsel expressed his concern that all exculpatory evidence had not been provided by the State. Although the new lead prosecutor represented to the trial court that all exculpatory evidence had been provided, he agreed to provide defense counsel with a statement given by Billy Glenn Williams, Lucy's ex-husband. In that statement, Billy Williams related that Lucy had asked him to keep their children during the afternoon of the day before [the victim] was shot; that, when he called Lucy around 6 p.m., she "broke down and told me about the trouble she had been having with [the victim]"; that Billy told her to go to the police and get a restraining order; that Lucy told him that she thought [the victim] had put dirt in her car's gas tank; and that Lucy was upset when they finished the telephone conversation.


Masonheimer, 154 S.W.3d at 252. (3)


Appellee subsequently pled nolo contendere to the murder charge without an evidentiary stipulation, requiring the State to present evidence establishing appellee's guilt. See Article 1.15, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. (4) During this proceeding (or second "trial") before the trial court in April 2003, Joiner disclosed to the defense more previously undisclosed evidence. This undisclosed evidence was a statement from one of the victim's friends (Upchurch), which prompted another mistrial motion by appellee. The Court of Appeals' opinion summarizes this evidence (the Upchurch statement):

Upchurch was the first witness called by [appellee] in support of its [mistrial] motion. Upchurch, a friend of [the victim's], testified that he had helped remove [the victim's] belongings from the apartment after [the victim's] death. Upchurch took five old Coke machines to a store in Baird to be sold on consignment. The owners of the store, Mark and Tricia Duque, had known [the victim] and had sold Coke memorabilia for him in the past. Upchurch said that he, Mark, and Tricia had opened one of the Coke boxes and discovered several "syringes with orange caps" and small card-board boxes. Upchurch asked Tricia, a practicing nurse, what the boxes were, "and she said steroids." Upchurch told Tricia to throw the syringes and boxes away because he did not want [the victim's] ex-wife to know that [the victim] had kept steroids.


Masonheimer, 154 S.W.3d at 253. (5)


In July 2003, the trial court held a hearing on appellee's mistrial motion. Testimony was presented at this hearing that the lead prosecutor (Judge Harper) in the first trial and his investigator (Clappart) were aware of the Upchurch statement prior to the first trial. See also id. Clappart testified that he and Harper interviewed Upchurch before the first trial, and, during that interview, Upchurch made the above-summarized statement. Clappart also testified that he made notes of his interviews with the Duques and that he believed that he gave these notes to Harper. None of this information, including Clappart's notes, were in the State's file. Clappart did not believe that Joiner (the second prosecutor) knew about the Upchurch statement. Harper testified that he did not recall receiving the information contained in the Upchurch statement.

Q. [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: Well, do you understand that both [sic] John Upchurch has testified that you were there and you're the one he was directing this information to; Steve Clappart has also testified you were there and that you were the one that the information was directed to; that after-that he was making notes, he thinks, at the time; that when he had conversations with these other two people that confirmed the Upchurch version, that he went back and told you that that's what the people had said, and he thinks he gave you his notes about that. Does that jog your memory?


A. [HARPER]: That Steve gave me his notes?


Q. Yeah. Or at least told you about it. It's his opinion he gave you the notes. He can't specifically say he gave you notes; he told you about it.


A. I don't recall that, but if that's true, then, yes, it should have been given to you.

* * *

Q. Assuming again the scenario that I'd asked you to assume earlier in the testimony of what Mr. Upchurch and Mr. Clappart have testified to, and based upon your testimony and your notes, assuming that is the meeting-


A. That-


Q. -the one thing we know is, either Mr. Clappart and John Upchurch are lying to the Court, or you intentionally didn't write those things down. Would you agree with that?


[JOINER]: Objection, Your Honor. Speculation.


Q. Well, what other option do you see?


A. I know that Mr. Joiner visited with witnesses independently, I know that Mr. Clappart visited with witnesses independently, I know that on occasion I visit with witnesses independently. I don't know if they visited and they discussed that or not. I know that on this occasion this is what we talked about.


Q. Are you just baffled about how all this happened, Judge?


[JOINER]: Object, Your Honor. Argumentative.


[APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: I don't mean to be argumentative.


[TRIAL COURT]: Overruled.


Q. Are you just baffled about how we got in this position with Upchurch and Clappart saying they told you, you admitting that it-we should have had it on discovery, and everybody conceding we didn't get it.


A. That's correct. You-if-You should have gotten it. Even if I did not know about it, Mr. Burke, we're presumed to know the information that our officers have taken notes, police officers; even if we in good conscience didn't know about it, as I understand the law, we're supposed to give it to you. That's what I'm saying.[ (6)]


Joiner testified at the hearing on appellee's mistrial motion that he first became aware of the Upchurch statement when he interviewed Upchurch during the second trial in April 2003. Joiner immediately disclosed this information to the defense. Joiner admitted that the Marshall, Williams, and Upchurch statements should have been disclosed to the defense prior to the first trial in December 2002. See also Masonheimer, 154 S.W.3d at 253 ("To his credit, Joiner admitted that all three statements should have been disclosed as Brady material prior to the first trial"). The State made no claim that it had no obligation to disclose this evidence prior to the first trial. (7)

Appellee's current counsel, who was also appellee's counsel in the first trial, testified in narrative form at the hearing on appellee's mistrial motion:

[APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: We proceeded to [the first] trial in December 2002. At that time Burt Burnett was also assisting my son and I in preparation of the case. There are untold numerous times while we were working on this case the month prior to trial that I would say to them, "How in the world is the State going to prove that [appellee] is the one who shot [the victim] without introducing his statement?" meaning [appellee's]. I had the feeling, based upon some things that had transpired, that they were not going to put on [appellee's] statement. We could never answer that question: How are they going to prove it? Because they had given us all of the exculpatory evidence, and of course they wouldn't have to give us that; I kept saying, "There must be somebody that either saw it or told them that, that-that he told them he did."


We get into the trial, and the third witness, Timmy Marshall, when he makes the statement, which the Court has in Defense Exhibit No. 4, in response to Judge Harper's question, that "He said he shot him" and was going to continue on but then was interrupted,[ (8)] and I leaned over and told either Mr. Burnett or my son, "Now we know the answer to my question."


After Mr. Marshall finished testifying, we started asking him questions, found out he'd given a statement, got a copy of his statement. That's the first time that we had ever seen Defendant's Exhibit No. 14. With a very hurried reading in Court, I then asked for a recess, and we began what later led to hearings and everything else about their failure to furnish us with that in conformity with the judge's order of discovery that it contained exculpatory statements that had not been afforded us. A mistrial was subsequently declared in that case before we did anything further.

* * *

Now, in response to what they told us about-or didn't tell us, on Timothy Marshall's statement. And in response to my question, how are they going to prove it up, it was my professional opinion, after practicing law for some thirty-seven years, that only an idiot would have proved up murder through [Police Chief] Bob Jones, that Bob Jones was going to give us some awfully good testimony, which he did, and in front of the jury I think that would have been devastating to them. The same thing is true with why they wouldn't want to introduce [appellee's] statement. They weren't going to do it that way, either. And I kept telling the boys, "They got something, folks. They've got something," and then we find it was Tim Marshall, during the trial, on a statement that we were entitled to, that they tried to keep from us, I think.


The State argued to the trial court at the hearing on appellee's mistrial motion that there is no evidence that it "did this to goad them into asking for a mistrial, or that [it] knew that if they found this out that it would goad them into a mistrial." The State further claimed that the posture of this case was a "plea hearing" and that the appropriate remedy was not a mistrial but to allow "the Defense to withdraw their plea, they can choose the factfinder they want, they can choose the plea they want, and we can try this case." (9)

Appellee claimed, among other things, that "the decision was made to come in and waive a jury and to enter a plea of no contest before this Court by the Defense based upon erroneous and false information." Appellee also claimed that the second proceeding was a trial and not "just a big plea hearing." Appellee asserted that he still had "a defense of self-defense before the Court" and that the second proceeding should not be characterized "like we just came into court, signed a stipulation and confession, and here we go on punishment, and that's certainly not what we've been listening to for the first two days of trial." Appellee further claimed that the State's failure to disclose the exculpatory evidence was done in "bad faith" and that the "only remedy at law at this time this Court can grant to protect [appellee's] due process rights afforded him by the Constitution of the U.S. and the Texas State Constitution is to grant a mistrial."

[APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: The problem is, see, they tell us now, but they've known since October of 2002 that there were steroids found. They don't tell us till a day in after we've selected a trier of fact.


I don't agree with Mr. Joiner. He wants to make this sound like this just a big plea hearing. This is a trial. It was made clear to us before we started that this Court was going to hear evidence on guilt-innocence. This court still has to determine whether or not there's sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain his finding of guilt, assuming that's where this Court would be headed. We still have a defense of self-defense before the Court. So I don't characterize this like we just came into court, signed a stipulation and confession, and here we go on punishment, and that's certainly not what we've been listening to for the first two days of trial. It's been guilt-innocence type of evidence.


They say that they're not withholding it? And the Court will recall this. We only got Mr. Marshall's statement last time after we had twelve people seated in this room and I was about to start his cross examination and asked him whether or not he had given a statement to the D.A.'s office, to which he responded "Yes." At that time I walk around counsel table and get it from [Harper] and find that it has these statements about that this man told Mr. Marshall the man had been threatening his daughter and it was either him or her. They all admit that's exculpatory now. Yeah, they sure enough gave it to me, but not in accordance with Brady. They gave it to me at their own convenience.


The Williams statement was only given after a pretrial that this Court had when my father asked the Court to look at the State's file, and it was determined that wasn't necessary but the D.A., Mr. Joiner, was going to go through the file and just make sure there wasn't anything else in there, and then he hands over Mr. Williams' statement. This is again after the first trial we had we were alleging they were withholding exculpatory evidence, and now we all agree, by their own testimony, that sure enough, some statements that are held in Mr. Marshall's-or, excuse me, in Mr. Williams' written statement are also exculpatory and could be considered mitigating or favorable to the Defense.


And then, yes, we got the information Tuesday afternoon, regarding the steroids from Mr. Joiner, but, Judge, you heard the testimony from [Clappart]: He knows that's exculpatory, he thinks he told Mr. Harper, remembers doing that, can't find any notes, believes it should have been given over to us, believes it would have been favorable, knows that we were asserting steroids in this case, and yet nobody says a darn thing. They knew that prior to the first trial.


If that doesn't show some bad faith on the part of somebody from the district attorney's office I don't know what does. We were in here voir diring a jury panel of people in this courtroom, bringing up steroids, and these people withholding evidence that they know they found steroids? Evidence that now they're willing to stipulate before this Court? When I started this motion I said we don't have a big enough rug to keep sweeping this under, and I submit that that's true today. We just have stuff getting piled up now on top of the rug after the testimony yesterday.


The only remedy at law at this time this Court can grant to protect this man's due process rights afforded him by the Constitution of the U.S. and the Texas State Constitution is to grant a mistrial. Thank you.

After hearing the parties' arguments, the trial court granted appellee's request for another mistrial. The trial court also made an oral finding on the record that the Marshall, Williams, and Upchurch statements "are all exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland" and that the State's failure to disclose this exculpatory evidence prior to the first trial was "reckless conduct."

[TRIAL COURT]: I find that in this case the statements and the evidence that was withheld concerning Mr. Marshall's statement, Mr. Williams' statement, and the evidence given by Mr. Upchurch, are all exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland. I find that the evidence was-particularly the Upchurch evidence, was a surprise during this trial, and the Marshall evidence was a surprise during the first trial. I find the evidence is favorable to the Defense and certainly material and relevant to the defense that they are raising, which is that of self-defense or defense of a third party.


I also find that it's a violation of due process and a violation of the Texas Constitution and U.S. Constitution for this information not to have been provided to the defendant before the very first trial, not this trial but the first trial.


I find, therefore, that the only remedy available to this Court is that of a mistrial. The Court now declares a mistrial in this case. The case remains on the Court's docket.


Court's in recess.


Let's get back on the record just a moment, please. I also find that the conduct of the State in not providing this information about which they knew to the Defense in a timely manner constituted reckless conduct.

Appellee subsequently filed a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus "seeking relief from double jeopardy." This motion sought to bar any further prosecution of appellee. Although this motion asserted that any further prosecution of appellee was barred by the double-jeopardy provisions of the state and federal constitutions, it relied almost exclusively on our state constitutional double-jeopardy provision and the trial court's finding that the State engaged in "reckless conduct" in failing to disclose the Brady material before appellee's first trial. The trial court held a hearing on appellee's pretrial writ of habeas corpus, (10) during which appellee relied almost exclusively on this Court's decision in Bauder v. State (11) in support of his claim that any further prosecution of him is jeopardy-barred under our state constitution. Appellee also argued that "this hadn't been any prosecution seeking justice" and that "[f]rom day one their investigation, everything they've done, has just been set out not for a fair trial, but to get a conviction in this case."

[DEFENSE]: I'll make another copy of [Bauder].


Bauder is a case that we believe to be on point. and [sic] I think the State of Texas would probably concede that fact. They have a brief here that breaks it down at length in some form or fashion, but it is Bauder v. State, May 8th of 1996, and it's the Court of Criminal Appeals sitting en banc, where they apply standards for jeopardy as well as exculpatory evidence and jeopardy barred prosecutions thereon.


A point I'd like to make before I sit down here in a minute and let the State argue-because I've read the State's brief responding to our Application for Habeas Corpus wherein they say that the Bauder holding is that you've got to find a conscious disregard on the part of the-on the part of the prosecutor. Well, then in their brief they go on, and I think it's-anybody that's been to law school, conscious disregard typically equals recklessness. That's what we believe that to be akin to, and that's certainly the way this case sets it out. But what I think is very important in Bauder, if you go on an [sic] read the entire case, they do hold conscious disregard in the first, but then go on to state-and I want to cite this in the second paragraph of the holding-(reading) making the Constitutional rights of a criminal Defendant to turn upon such a fuzzy and imponderable distinction as whether the prosecutor actually intended the trial to be terminated or being aware that his conduct creates a risk that a mistrial is reasonably certain to occur, consciously disregards that risk seems far too insensitive a criterion for decisions in these cases. In short, we don't believe the purpose of the Constitutional right here in issue really has anything to do with the Prosecutor's specific intent.


Now, I know this Court has already held, and I think we're bound by that, on April 24th that they acted recklessly, but I think we can even take it a step further. If the Court hadn't held as such, Bauder, I don't think, requires us to have a specific finding. If you read Bauder that way, it makes it-and it makes sense. How in the world are we supposed to figure out what these people are doing?


Now, you can look at their course of conduct. I may have my opinion. Mr. Masonheimer certainly has his opinion in regards to what these folks have been doing all along, but I think trying to put us in the position to convince this Court that they acted with some specific mens rea would be ridiculous, and I think that's what Bauder stands for.


This is a case, Judge, that the facts are these: There was a specific discovery order where Brady material was ordered to be disclosed. There were pretrial hearings where the State has represented that they gave us all the exculpatory evidence. We know now that they withheld evidence that this Court has determined to be exculpatory, three pieces particularly. We have stopped the proceedings both times prior to judgment. This is not a case where a new trial is in effect, but we're prior to judgment during an evidentiary hearing. We had a mistrial granted based on the fact that these three pieces of evidence were not given and that they were exculpatory, being favorable, being relevant, being material to our Defense, and then we have a finding that the conduct on the part of the District Attorney's office was reckless.


In accordance with Bauder and in accordance where [sic] the Constitution of the United States and the Texas State Constitution via the 14th Amendment, I think this Court is in a position where they are required to grant our Application for Habeas Corpus and find that double jeopardy has attached in this case, and that's what we're going to ask the Court to do.

* * *

What it's about is you have a case, Brady, that says, "You're supposed to-you have an affirmative duty, Mr. Joiner or Mr. Harper, or Mr. Clappert as your agent, to make sure that all exculpatory or mitigating evidence is turned over to the Defense prior to time of trial." We have a pretrial order telling them that, just in case they don't know it, and then when you show up at trial and they don't give it, and they get caught[ (12)] December the 6th, and then you show up in April, and we have a pretrial, and they say, "We've given everything to you," and sure enough, we find again there's another statement they haven't given us, and then we show up April 27th and find out that there's steroids they haven't given us or evidence thereof. We keep violating Brady, and when you violate Brady, you violate the due process rights of this man, and you violate the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution, and that's-it's simple. It's a simple analysis, really, in this case.


So, no, I'm not here to punish them. I'm here to do, I guess, what they should be doing, which is justice. This hadn't been any prosecution seeking justice. From day one their investigation, everything they've done, has just been set out not for a fair trial, but to get a conviction in this case. They've gone to lengths that I can't believe, and when they get disagreements between their own employees or agents and former employees, I think that shows you how serious this matter has become, but it shouldn't prejudice our client. That's not what it's all about.


We understand the record to reflect that the State argued that further prosecution of appellee is not jeopardy-barred because the trial court should have continued the second trial instead of terminating it since the Marshall, Williams, and Upchurch statements had been disclosed to appellee before the second trial was terminated. Appellee's counsel responded that it took "two trials, numerous pretrial hearings, [and] two motions for mistrial" to get this evidence and that the State's tardy disclosure of this evidence did not prevent appellee "from being tried time and time again."

[APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: The other thing is, is when they start talking about due process and that we haven't focused on it, Your Honor, you've already found this was a violation of due process at the time you granted the mistrial, but due process focuses on the Defendant under this circumstance, not the State. You know, they keep coming-they tell us, "Don't worry about it. Now they've got our entire file." Great! What's it taken us to get their entire file? It's taken us two trials, numerous pretrial hearings, two motions for mistrial, and sure enough, maybe we've got it now. All I know is every time we get ready for trial and start putting on evidence, what do you know, we find more exculpatory evidence. We're trying to protect this man from being tried time and time again.


At the conclusion of the hearing on appellee's pretrial writ of habeas corpus, the trial court made an oral finding that "double jeopardy has attached" and ordered the case dismissed with prejudice. The trial court later signed an order dismissing the case with prejudice based on its finding that "the instant offense is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Texas Constitutions."

The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals decided that further prosecution of appellee is not jeopardy-barred under either the state or federal constitutions. See Masonheimer, 154 S.W.3d at 251. The Court of Appeals decided that there is no evidence that the "new lead prosecutor in the second trial" acted "intentionally, a critical mens rea" for federal constitutional purposes under Oregon v. Kennedy or "recklessly, a critical mens rea" under Bauder. See Masonheimer, 154 S.W.3d at 251. Appellee filed a petition for discretionary review, and the State filed a cross-petition for discretionary review.

After the Court of Appeals decided this case, this Court overruled Bauder in Ex parte Lewis, S.W.3d (Tex.Cr.App. No. PD-0577-05, delivered January 10, 2007). In Lewis, this Court adopted, as a matter of state constitutional law, the federal constitutional standard set out in Oregon v. Kennedy (13) for determining whether a retrial is barred after a defense-requested mistrial. Lewis, slip op. at 64. The issue, therefore, is whether the record supports the trial court's ruling that any further prosecution of appellee is jeopardy-barred under the Oregon v. Kennedy standard. And, since appellee won in the trial court, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. (14)

In considering whether the State acted "intentionally" under the Oregon v. Kennedy standard, the Court of Appeals considered only the mens rea of the "new lead prosecutor." See Masonheimer, 154 S.W.2d at 251, 254. Appellee claims in his first ground for review that the State encompasses the entire prosecutorial team (not just the "new lead prosecutor") in determining whether the State acted "intentionally." We agree that, in determining whether the State acted "intentionally" under the Oregon v. Kennedy standard, it is necessary to also consider the mens rea of the lead prosecutor in the first trial. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) ("The prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government. A promise made by one attorney must be attributed, for these purposes, to the Government.").

The Oregon v. Kennedy decision was intended to "delineate the bounds" of the "narrow exception" to the general rule that there is no jeopardy bar to a retrial after a defense-requested mistrial. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673. The Oregon v. Kennedy standard delineating these bounds is usually read to mean that a retrial after a defense-requested mistrial is jeopardy-barred only when the prosecutorial "conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke [or goad] the defendant into moving for a mistrial." See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676, 679; Lewis, slip op. at 1. (15)

In support of this specific proposition, Oregon v. Kennedy cites to footnote three in United States v. Tateo. (16) See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673 n.4. In Tateo, the defendant claimed that a retrial was barred after his conviction was set aside on collateral attack because of prejudicial comments that the trial court made in the prior trial. See Tateo, 377 U.S. at 463-64. In rejecting this claim, the Court noted that if "Tateo had requested a mistrial on the basis of the judge's comments, there would be no doubt that if he had been successful, the Government would not have been barred from retrying him." See Tateo, 377 U.S. at 467 (emphasis in original). The Tateo Court then stated in footnote three of its opinion that "[i]f there were any intimation in a case that prosecutorial or judicial impropriety justifying a mistrial resulted from a fear that the jury was likely to acquit the accused, different considerations would, of course, obtain." See Tateo, 377 U.S. at 468 n.3. The Court's opinion in Oregon v. Kennedy makes another citation to footnote three in Tateo as an example of the "narrow exception" to the general rule that there is no jeopardy bar to a retrial after a defense-requested mistrial. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673.

Another case that Oregon v. Kennedy cites for the proposition that retrial is barred when the prosecution intentionally goads a defendant into moving for a mistrial is United States v. Dinitz. (17) See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673. In Dinitz, the defendant claimed that a retrial was jeopardy-barred after he successfully moved for a mistrial because of actions that the trial court took against one of his lawyers. See Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 602-06. The Court rejected this claim, in part, because the trial court's actions were not done "to prejudice [the defendant's] prospects for an acquittal." See Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611. The Oregon v. Kennedy case appears to cite with approval a similar statement from another plurality opinion stating that "where a defendant's mistrial motion is necessitated by judicial or prosecutorial impropriety designed to avoid an acquittal, reprosecution might be barred." See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 678-79; see also Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804, 826 n.7 (Tex.Cr.App. 2003) (Hervey, J., dissenting).

Keeping in mind that we are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling that prosecuting appellee a third time is jeopardy-barred, we are constrained to decide that the extensive portions of the record set out in this opinion support a finding that appellee's mistrial motions were necessitated primarily by the State's "intentional" failure to disclose exculpatory evidence that was available prior to appellee's first trial with the specific intent to avoid the possibility of an acquittal. (18) Under Oregon v. Kennedy, this deliberate conduct, accompanied by this specific mens rea, bars a retrial. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673, 678-79; Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611; Tateo, 377 U.S. at 678 n.3; United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912, 915-16 (2nd Cir. 1992) (there is some force to the argument that Oregon v. Kennedy protects a defendant from a retrial after a defense-requested mistrial where prosecutorial misconduct [resulting in the mistrial, not a reversal on appeal] is undertaken with the intention of denying the defendant an opportunity to win an acquittal); State v. Marti, 784 A.2d 1193, 1196-97 (N.H. 2001) (Oregon v. Kennedy would bar retrial after defense-requested mistrial when "prosecutor engaged in misconduct with the specific intent to avoid an acquittal which the prosecutor believed was likely to occur in the absence of the misconduct"); State v. Lettice, 585 N.W.2d 171, 181 (WI. 1998) (same); State v. Colton, 663 A.2d 339, 345-46 (CT. 1995) (same); (19) see also Thanos v. State, 625 A.2d 932, 937-38 (Md. 1993) (double jeopardy does not bar retrial after defense-requested mistrial unless State intentionally commits misconduct with the specific intent of forcing defendant to move or consent to mistrial or with the specific intent of prejudicing defendant's prospects for an acquittal if trial continued to verdict); Hagez v. Maryland, 749 A.2d 206, 217-29 (Md. Spec. App. 2000) (Oregon v. Kennedy may prohibit a retrial after a defense-requested mistrial [not a reversal on appeal] resulting from State's deliberate conduct prompted by a desire to "sabotage" a probable acquittal) and at 229-31 (Moylan, J., concurring); West v. State, 451 A.2d 1228, 1231-36, 1233 (Md. Spec. App. 1982) (retrial after defense-requested mistrial is jeopardy-barred under Oregon v. Kennedy when "prosecutorial or judicial impropriety justifying a mistrial resulted from a fear that the jury was likely to acquit the accused") (quoting footnote three in Tateo); (20) Tabbs v. State, 403 A.2d 796, 812 (Md. Spec. App. 1979). We are persuaded that, in a case like this, a defendant suffers the same harm as when the State intentionally "goads" or provokes the defendant into moving for a mistrial. (21) Under the unique circumstances of this case, we decide that a third prosecution of appellee is jeopardy-barred under state and federal constitutional double-jeopardy principles.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. (22)

Hervey, J.


Delivered: March 21, 2007

Publish

1. The trial court found that the State should have disclosed this evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), before appellee's first trial. The issue of whether the undisclosed evidence meets Brady is not before the Court because this issue was not raised as a ground on discretionary review. This opinion, therefore, assumes without deciding that the undisclosed evidence meets Brady. We do note that the defense, the State, the trial court and the Court of Appeals all seem to agree that the undisclosed evidence meets Brady.

2. The trial court ordered the State to disclose to the defense any evidence that was "clearly exculpatory" and to turn over to the court for an in camera inspection "anything borderline that the State has any doubts about at all about whether or not it's exculpatory evidence."


[THE COURT]: I'm going to order a couple of things. I'm going to order the State to reexamine its file, and if, you know, there's anything borderline that the State has any doubts about at all about whether or not it's exculpatory evidence, then the State will submit that to me in camera, then I'll look at it. If you should discover something that is clearly exculpatory, obviously you know to give that to the Defense as soon as possible.

3. The Court of Appeals agreed that the Williams statement should have been disclosed to the defense because it would "rebut any prosecution evidence showing that [the victim] was a peaceful man" and it would "rebut any contention by the prosecution that Lucy's testimony concerning [the victim's] stalking behavior was recently fabricated to help her father develop a theory of self-defense." See Masonheimer, 154 S.W.3d at 252.

4. The second proceeding on appellee's nolo contendere plea, however, was not an ordinary plea proceeding as reflected by the record in the hearing on appellee's pretrial writ of habeas corpus:


[APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: Judge, as you're well aware, we convened this case for the second time on April the 21st where [appellee] entered a plea of no contest to this Court, and on that day, as you will very well recall, you admonished both the State, as well as [appellee], of what you expected to take place in that evidentiary hearing. You admonished the State that they would be required-since this wasn't a very typical plea-type case; it wasn't when we were pleading guilty. We pled no contest, and you admonished the State that they would be required to provide sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of guilt. You also told the Defense that we would be entitled at that time, after the State rested, to put on evidence of any defenses, if we had those, in that case, and everybody was well aware of that, I think, before we began.

5. Appellee's counsel claimed at the mistrial hearing that evidence of the victim's steroid use was an important issue to the defense. See Masonheimer, 154 S.W.3d at 250. Appellee's counsel asserted that "we had been told that [the victim] had told some people that he used steroids and that that information had been passed on to [appellee] prior to the shooting. We had no direct evidence of his steroid usage other than what [the victim] had represented to others." Appellee presented, at the mistrial hearing, the testimony of a physician who was treating the victim for depression shortly before the shooting. This physician testified that he was not aware that the victim may have been using steroids and that any use of steroids by the victim could have caused "aggression, anger, irritability." Harper testified that he knew before the first trial that any use of steroids by the victim was "very critical" to the defense.


Q. [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: So you knew that, at least from our standpoint, we thought that the use of steroid was very critical?


A. [HARPER]: At some point in the pretrial part of it, yes, I did.

* * *

Q. But you do concede that the stash of steroids, that if you had known that, that would certainly be vitally critical to our defense?


A. When I note-found notice of it, when Mr. Joiner told me about it, he told me he was giving it to you, this was recent, I agree that that should have been given to you, yes.

6. Harper also testified that he did not believe that the Marshall statement "might be exculpatory or favorable to the defendant."


Q. [APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: Can you understand how that statement-"he was threatening"-to the man that first comes up, with the body lying in the street, and says, "What happened?" and he says "He was threatening my daughter, and it was him"-or however-or "him or me," whatever those words are, you don't understand how that might be exculpatory or favorable to the defendant?


A. [HARPER]: I did not.

7. Appellee's counsel also argued at the mistrial hearing:


I believe that based on the testimony of the State's own witnesses, and what I mean by that is [Upchuch, Clappart, Harper, and Joiner], they all believe that these three pieces of evidence at this time they knew about would be favorable to the Defense and sure enough they didn't give them to us. [Clappart and Joiner] all even went a little further to state that they agree that those are three pieces of evidence that, in accordance with [Brady], would be considered exculpatory evidence.

8. At the mistrial hearing, appellee's counsel suggested through his direct examination of Harper that Harper intentionally cut Marshall off during his direct examination of Marshall at the first trial when Marshall was about to testify that appellee told him minutes after shooting the victim that the victim had threatened him.


[APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: Do you recall in [the first trial] Mr. Marshall, in response to your question, "Did you ask [appellee] anything? his answer was, "Yes, sir. I asked him if he did it. He said yes." And he started to continue on, "He said that he threatened-" and you interrupted him, raised your hand and interrupted him and asked another question. Do you recall that?


A. [HARPER]: [The reporter's record from the first trial] reads-it-the only way I can do it is the way it reads.


The reporter's record from appellee's first trial appears to reflect that Harper interrupted Marshall when he was about to testify that appellee told him that the victim had threatened him:


Q. [HARPER]: Did you ask [appellee] anything?


A. [MARSHALL]: Yes, sir. I asked him if he did it. He said yes. He said that he threatened-


Q. How was his demeanor?

9. Since some of the witnesses through whom the steroid evidence would have been presented apparently were unavailable, the State also offered to stipulate that the victim was in possession of steroids. The trial court responded that the defense "might have elected to have a jury trial instead of going to court" had the State timely disclosed this evidence.


[THE STATE]: Your Honor, our remedy would be to say, you know, we'll stipulate that these are steroids. Aside from what they're-I guess they're saying that these were deliberately kept out. It's our position that they were not deliberately kept out and that we will do what we can to erase the harm by not being able to contact these witnesses by saying we will stipulate that if you contacted them, they would say it was steroids, which is what the evidence that we have is what they would say. There was no evidence of testing, say-you know, we'll say they were steroids. Give them the benefit of the doubt, I guess.


[TRIAL COURT]: Of course, their argument is they've been harmed because, had they had this information before Monday, they might have elected to have a jury trial instead of going to the Court.


[STATE]: I understand, Your Honor.


[TRIAL COURT]: That's their position on that.

10. At the beginning of this hearing, appellee's counsel reminded the trial court that the second trial "wasn't a very typical plea-type case" and that the trial court indicated that it would permit appellee "to put on evidence of any defenses" at this second trial, suggesting that appellee might avoid conviction or that his defensive evidence could be considered in mitigation of punishment.


[APPELLEE'S COUNSEL]: Judge, as you're well aware, we convened this case for the second time on April the 21st where Mr. Masonheimer entered a plea of no contest to this Court, and on that day, as you will very well recall, you admonished both the State, as well as the Defendant, of what you expected to take place in that evidentiary hearing. You admonished the State that they would be required-since this wasn't a very typical plea-type case; it wasn't when [sic] we were pleading guilty. We pled no contest, and you admonished the State that they would be required to provide sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of guilt. You also told the Defense that we would be entitled at that time, after the State rested, to put on evidence of any defenses, if we had those, in that case, and everybody was well aware of that, I think, before we began.

11. 921 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex.Cr.App. 1996).

12. Emphasis supplied.

13. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).

14. See State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818-19 (Tex.Cr.App. 2006).

15. This apparently would apply even when the prosecutorial misconduct (though accompanied by an intent to provoke a mistrial) was not so seriously prejudicial as to compromise the defendant's valued right to have his guilt-innocence determined before the first trier of fact. But see Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676 and cases cited. For example, under a strict application of the "intending to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial" language in Oregon v. Kennedy, a retrial would be jeopardy-barred after the defense-requested mistrial provoked by the comment in Oregon v. Kennedy (State referring to defendant as a "crook") as long as the State intended to provoke this defense-requested mistrial even though its comment obviously did not compromise the defendant's valued right to have his guilt-innocence determined by the first jury.

16. 377 U.S. 463, 468 n.3 (1964).

17. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).

18. The trial court could have also reasonably found that the State believed that the undisclosed evidence may have made the difference between a conviction and an acquittal. Under these circumstances, appellee's valued right to have his guilt-innocence determined by the jury in the first trial and, "perhaps, end the dispute then and there with an acquittal" was something of a "hollow shell" even though this may not have become apparent until the middle of the second trial. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673. In Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 608, the Court stated:


The distinction between mistrials declared by the court sua sponte and mistrials granted at the defendant's request or with his consent is wholly consistent with the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Even when judicial or prosecutorial error prejudices a defendant's prospects of securing an acquittal, he may nonetheless desire "to go to the first jury and, perhaps, end the dispute then and there with an acquittal." (Citation omitted). Our prior decisions recognize the defendant's right to pursue this course in the absence of circumstances of manifest necessity requiring a sua sponte judicial declaration of mistrial. But it is evident that when judicial or prosecutorial error seriously prejudices a defendant, he may have little interest in completing the trial and obtaining a verdict from the first jury. The defendant may reasonably conclude that a continuation of the tainted proceeding would result in a conviction followed by a lengthy appeal and, if a reversal is secured, by a second prosecution. In such circumstances, a defendant's mistrial request has objectives not unlike the interests served by the Double Jeopardy Clause-the avoidance of the anxiety, expense, and delay occasioned by multiple prosecutions.

19. These latter three cases (Marti, Lettice, and Colton) decided that Oregon v. Kennedy would bar retrial under these circumstances even when there was no defense-requested mistrial and the defendant's conviction was reversed on appeal. The rule applied in this case, however, is limited to retrial after a defense-requested mistrial. This rule arguably would not apply to a retrial after a reversal of a defendant's conviction on appeal because, in such a situation, the defendant's valued right to have guilt-innocence determined by the first trier of fact has not been compromised. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676.

20. In West, 451 A.2d at 1235, the Court stated that what "is encompassed by intentional misconduct . . . is not the mere general intent to do the act but, additionally, the special intent to attain some specific end thereby." West provides two situations where retrial after a defense-requested mistrial is jeopardy-barred under Oregon v. Kennedy. See West, 451 A.2d at 1235. The second, more familiar, situation is a mistrial when the prosecution intentionally commits some erroneous act with the specific intent to provoke or goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial to avert a probable acquittal. See id. The first, less familiar, situation is a mistrial when the prosecution attempts not to get caught intentionally committing some erroneous act (e.g., not disclosing evidence) with the specific intent to avoid a probable defeat. See id. The evidence in this case supports this latter situation. Also, recall that the State claimed at the mistrial hearing that there is no evidence that it "did this to goad [the defense] into asking for a mistrial, or that [it] knew that if [the defense] found this out that it would goad them into a mistrial." (Emphasis supplied).

21. See Adam M. Harris, Note, Two Constitutional Wrongs Do Not Make A Right: Double Jeopardy and Prosecutorial Misconduct Under The Brady Doctrine, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 931, 944-52 (November 2006) (if Oregon v. Kennedy bars a retrial where a prosecutor commits an act of misconduct with the intention of provoking a mistrial motion by the defendant, it should also bar a retrial where a prosecutor commits grave misconduct with the intent to avoid an acquittal he believes is likely, because the defendant suffers the same harm in both cases), and at 946 ("Under the rule set out in [Oregon v. Kennedy], the prosecutor violates the Double Jeopardy Clause when he has a specific intent to cause a mistrial, purportedly to avoid an acquittal. [Footnote omitted]. In the case where a prosecutor proceeds to trial in violation of Brady, the prosecutor still subjects the defendant to the identical risk of mistrial, with the intent of securing a conviction. [Footnote omitted]. There should be no distinction between these two situations.").

22. We believe that this renders moot the claim presented in the ground for review in the State's cross-petition for discretionary review that Brady does not apply to a nolo contendere plea under the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002). We do not believe that this would apply to the not "very typical plea-type" second proceeding in this case.

80R877 ESH-D

By: Corte H.B. No. 18






A BILL TO BE ENTITLED
1-1 AN ACT
1-2 relating to creation of a public education voucher pilot program
1-3 for certain children.
1-4 BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:
1-5 SECTION 1. Chapter 29, Education Code, is amended by adding
1-6 Subchapter J to read as follows:
1-7 SUBCHAPTER J. PUBLIC EDUCATION VOUCHER PILOT PROGRAM
1-8 Sec. 29.351. DEFINITIONS. In this subchapter:
1-9 (1) "Parent" includes a guardian or custodian.
1-10 (2) "Private school" means a nongovernmental
1-11 educational establishment that exists for the general education of
1-12 elementary or secondary students. The term does not include a
1-13 school that provides education in a home setting or by the parent or
1-14 that limits enrollment to relatives of the school's staff.
1-15 Sec. 29.352. ELIGIBLE CHILD. (a) A child is eligible for a
1-16 voucher to be used to pay the costs of attending a private school if
1-17 the child:
1-18 (1) is educationally disadvantaged;
1-19 (2) is eligible to attend school under Section 25.001
1-20 in a school district that is among the six largest districts in
1-21 membership for the 2007-2008 school year, as determined by the
1-22 commissioner;
1-23 (3) was enrolled in a public school district during
1-24 the preceding school year or is enrolling in prekindergarten,
2-1 kindergarten, or first grade for the first time; and
2-2 (4) either:
2-3 (A) failed to perform satisfactorily on the most
2-4 recent assessment instrument administered to the child under
2-5 Section 39.023(a), (b), (c), or (l); or
2-6 (B) is eligible under Subchapter G to attend
2-7 another public school in the district in which the child resides or
2-8 to receive a public education grant to use to attend a public school
2-9 in another district, but has had an application to attend another
2-10 school in the child's district or in another district rejected.
2-11 (b) After a child establishes eligibility under Subsection
2-12 (a) and attends a private school using a voucher, the child is
2-13 entitled to continue receiving the voucher, regardless of whether
2-14 the child continues to meet the requirements of Subsection (a),
2-15 until the earlier of the date on which the child graduates from high
2-16 school or the child's 21st birthday, unless the child:
2-17 (1) enrolls in a public school district after using
2-18 the voucher; or
2-19 (2) changes residences and is no longer entitled under
2-20 Section 25.001 to attend school in the school district under which
2-21 the child's eligibility for a voucher was established.
2-22 Sec. 29.353. PARENTAL NOTIFICATION. (a) Not later than a
2-23 date established by the commissioner, a school district described
2-24 by Section 29.352(a)(2) shall notify in writing the parent of each
2-25 eligible child of the child's eligibility for a voucher.
2-26 (b) A parent may apply for a voucher on behalf of the
2-27 parent's child by notifying the school district by a date
3-1 established by the commissioner.
3-2 Sec. 29.354. AMOUNT OF VOUCHER; FINANCING. (a) A child's
3-3 voucher is an amount equal to the total average per student funding
3-4 amount in the school district the child would otherwise attend
3-5 during the preceding school year for maintenance and operations,
3-6 including state and local funding, but excluding money from the
3-7 available school fund.
3-8 (b) An eligible child who attends a private school in
3-9 compliance with this subchapter is entitled to 100 percent of the
3-10 child's voucher, unless the tuition charged by the school is less
3-11 than the amount of the voucher. In that event, the school district
3-12 the child would otherwise attend is entitled to the amount of the
3-13 voucher remaining after payment of tuition.
3-14 (c) An eligible child who attends a private school using a
3-15 voucher is included in determining the average daily attendance
3-16 under Section 42.005 of the school district in which the student
3-17 would otherwise attend school.
3-18 (d) A child's voucher is payable from the school district to
3-19 the private school on behalf of the child. A child's voucher is the
3-20 entitlement of the child, under the supervision of the child's
3-21 parent, is not an entitlement of any school, and is paid to a school
3-22 solely as a means of administrative convenience.
3-23 Sec. 29.355. ACCREDITATION. (a) Except as otherwise
3-24 provided by this section, a private school that accepts students
3-25 with vouchers must be accredited by a private organization
3-26 recognized by the commissioner.
3-27 (b) A newly established private school may receive voucher
4-1 funds without accreditation if the school applies for accreditation
4-2 before accepting students under the program.
4-3 (c) The commissioner may waive the requirements of this
4-4 section for good cause.
4-5 Sec. 29.356. ADMISSIONS. (a) A private school may not
4-6 refuse to enroll a child with a voucher on the basis of the child's
4-7 residence, race, national origin, ethnic background, religion,
4-8 disability, or academic achievement.
4-9 (b) A private school may refuse to enroll a child with a
4-10 voucher if the child:
4-11 (1) has been expelled from a public school; or
4-12 (2) has a criminal record.
4-13 (c) A private school may not consider the athletic ability
4-14 of a child with a voucher in any admission process relating to the
4-15 child.
4-16 (d) Except as provided by Subsection (e), a private school
4-17 that has more applicants with vouchers than available positions
4-18 must fill the positions by lottery. A private school must declare
4-19 the number of available positions and conduct the lottery for the
4-20 next school year not later than July 1 of each year.
4-21 (e) A private school may give preference to an enrolled
4-22 student to achieve continuity and to siblings of an enrolled
4-23 student or children residing in the same household as an enrolled
4-24 student for the convenience of the parents of those children.
4-25 Sec. 29.357. TUITION; ADDITIONAL CHARGES AND FEES. A
4-26 private school may not:
4-27 (1) charge an eligible child attending the school with
5-1 a voucher tuition:
5-2 (A) in addition to the voucher; or
5-3 (B) in an amount greater than the standard
5-4 tuition rate at the school; or
5-5 (2) assess any additional charge, other than a fee
5-6 that the board of trustees of a school district is authorized to
5-7 charge under Section 11.158, for providing an educational program
5-8 or service to the child.
5-9 Sec. 29.358. ACCOUNTABILITY. (a) A private school shall
5-10 administer to each student with a voucher who is enrolled in the
5-11 school the assessment instruments required under Section
5-12 39.023(a), (b), (c), or (l), or other comparable assessment
5-13 instruments approved by the commissioner, in the same manner as
5-14 those instruments are administered to public school students.
5-15 (b) A private school shall report to the commissioner
5-16 concerning the school's performance on the academic excellence
5-17 indicators under Section 39.051 for students with vouchers who are
5-18 enrolled in the school. The commissioner shall publish the school's
5-19 performance information and make it available to parents for
5-20 review.
5-21 Sec. 29.359. CERTIFICATION TO COMPTROLLER. To receive
5-22 voucher funds, a private school must certify to the comptroller
5-23 that the school has complied with the conditions imposed by Section
5-24 29.356.
5-25 Sec. 29.360. DUTIES OF COMPTROLLER. The comptroller shall
5-26 adopt rules, procedures, and forms for the payment of vouchers to
5-27 private schools on behalf of students attending those schools with
6-1 vouchers.
6-2 Sec. 29.361. EVALUATION AND REPORT. The commissioner, in
6-3 consultation with the school districts whose students are eligible
6-4 to participate in the pilot program, shall evaluate the program
6-5 established by this subchapter and report the evaluation, together
6-6 with recommendations, to the legislature not later than December 1,
6-7 2010.
6-8 Sec. 29.362. EXPIRATION. This subchapter expires
6-9 September 1, 2011, and vouchers may not be issued for the 2011-2012
6-10 or a later school year.
6-11 SECTION 2. The commissioner of education and the
6-12 comptroller shall implement the public education voucher pilot
6-13 program as provided by Subchapter J, Chapter 29, Education Code, as
6-14 added by this Act, beginning with the 2007-2008 school year.
6-15 SECTION 3. This Act takes effect immediately if it receives
6-16 a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, as
6-17 provided by Section 39, Article III, Texas Constitution. If this
6-18 Act does not receive the vote necessary for immediate effect, this
6-19 Act takes effect September 1, 2007.